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Abstract—The methods and application of cost-effectiveness
analysis have reached an advanced stage of development. Many
decision makers consider cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to be a
valid and feasible approach toward setting health priorities, and it
has been extensively applied in evaluating interventions and
developing evidence-based clinical guidelines. However, the
recommendations arising from cost-effectiveness analysis are often
not implemented as intended. A fundamental reason for the failure
to implement is that CEA assumes a single constraint, in the form of
the budget constraint, whereas in reality decision makers may be
faced with numerous other constraints. The objective of this article
is to develop a typology of constraints that may act as barriers to
implementation of cost-effectiveness recommendations. Six
categories of constraints are considered: the design of the health
system; costs of implementing change; system interactions between
interventions; uncertainty in estimates of costs and benefits; weak
governance; and political constraints. Where possible—and if
applicable—for each class of constraint, the article discusses ways
in which these constraints can be taken into account by a decision
maker wishing to pursue the principles of cost-effectiveness.
INTRODUCTION
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of health services has
been extensively applied to evaluate interventions and is a
key input in developing evidence-based clinical guidelines
and care quality standards. These guidelines and standards
offer systematic guidance on how health care professionals
should care for individuals with specific conditions. The prin-
ciple underlying conventional CEA is that it seeks to identify
the set of health interventions that maximizes some social
objective (usually improvements in aggregate health) subject
to a single publicly funded budget constraint. Although there
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are still many methodological challenges that remain unre-
solved, great strides have been made in resolving key issues.1
CEA is becoming an important mechanism for strategic pri-
ority setting in health systems, and many countries have put
in place agencies to advise on health system cost-effective-
ness issues. International organizations are increasingly
appealing to CEA as a basis for advising countries on priority
setting, in particular to determine benefit packages included
in universal health coverage in resource-constrained
settings.2
However, it remains the case that often the recommenda-
tions arising from CEA are not fully implemented, even
when decision makers agree with the underlying principle of
CEA—of obtaining maximum value from a limited health
service budget.[a] The failure to secure implementation of
CEA recommendations does not necessarily indicate a weak-
ness in the principles underlying the analytic approach or the
institutional arrangements employed by the health system. It
may be often the case that decision makers invoke perfectly
legitimate criteria that are not considered in the CEA meth-
odology when coming to priority-setting decisions. Failure to
implement in these circumstances may not negate the useful-
ness of the CEA, which has at the very least demonstrated
what is sacrificed (often in the form of lost health improve-
ment) by failing to implement. Nevertheless, the frequent
widespread reports of CEA recommendations being ignored
or modified does highlight the importance of understanding
the motivations of decision makers and raises the issue of
whether CEA ignores important elements of the priority-set-
ting process.
One class of practical factors that may have a major influ-
ence on priority setting is the potentially large set of con-
straints that inhibit change in the health system, in addition
to the global budget constraint. For example, all systems
have an existing configuration of institutions such as hospi-
tals that cannot be altered in the short term; the present pool
of skilled human resources may be strictly limited; many
changes impose short-term costs (such as training) that
detract from direct patient care; governance and information
infrastructure may be inadequate to ensure that new services
are delivered effectively; and powerful political forces of
various sorts may inhibit change throughout the health sys-
tem. The constraints that we discuss in this article are the
design of the health system; costs of implementing change;
system interactions between interventions; uncertainty in
estimates of costs and benefits; weak governance; and politi-
cal constraints. Not all priority-setting decisions face these
constraints. For example, replacing therapeutic drugs may
face hardly any barriers, whereas the implementation of
complex public health interventions is faced with multiple
constraints.
This narrative review assumes that decision makers wish
to maximize the societal value secured from their health
services budget and are considering the use of CEA to guide
that process. It then explores the role that constraints play in
influencing priority-setting decisions and assesses whether
and how they can be accommodated within the CEA method-
ology. The review is inspired by various group discussions
conducted as part of the International Decision Support Ini-
tiative. The objective of the article is to develop a typology
of constraints that may act as barriers to implementation of
cost-effectiveness recommendations. Where possible and
applicable, it sets out ways in which these constraints can be
accommodated in CEA models.
THE CONSTRAINTS
The cost-effectiveness model generally used for the evalua-
tion of health technologies—and health care and public
health interventions more widely—has become a central tool
for public-sector policy makers in many health care systems.3
It was developed to help decision makers with fixed public
resources to compare (1) different interventions for the same
health problem and (2) programs in different disease areas.
For a particular level of health care resources, the goal is to
choose from among all possible combination of programs the
set that maximizes total health benefits produced. See Drum-
mond et al.1 for an introduction to CEA.[b] The traditional
CEA methods presume the existence of only one salient con-
straint—the public finance budget constraint. Yet all of the
evidence suggests that many other constraints impinge on
decision makers, at least in the short run. These limitations to
traditional CEA gives rise to difficulties in interpreting CEA
findings for implementation by local decision makers. We
consider six broad categories of constraints that are most
commonly encountered in practical policy making, although
we acknowledge that there are additional ones that are not
discussed here.[c] They may explain why strategic decision
makers depart from national or international guidance.
Design of the Health System
System design constraints preclude certain flexibilities
and relate to the institutions of the health system (pur-
chasers and providers), the financing mechanism, regula-
tory arrangements, and the role of external agencies such
as donors. Important practical system constraints are the
short-run availability of capital or labor. For example, a
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highly cost-effective new intervention may require sub-
stantial additional staffing, but if the existing workforce
is already working at full capacity and existing interven-
tions cannot be abandoned, implementation may be infea-
sible. With respect to financing mechanism constraints,
CEA implicitly embraces an assumption that payment of
providers is solely by a single national funder, who is
able to specify which interventions are funded. In prac-
tice, however, private payments such as user charges
make it difficult to ensure that designated services are
always provided to the intended recipients.4 Constraints
imposed by finance donors can often take the form of
“vertical” organization of services for specific programs
such as HIV/AIDS services.5 Though this may optimize
delivery for the chosen program, it can also create serious
rigidities in how resources are deployed and prevent sys-
tems from realizing the economies of scope[d] available
by integrating services “horizontally” for a wide range of
conditions.
Provider reimbursement through capitation payments
or global budgets can constitute another important finan-
cial constraint, because it may provide weak incentives
for providers to deliver a recommended intervention as
intended. Augmenting conventional provider payment
methods with various forms of pay-for-performance may
address this constraint, and there is some evidence that
pay-for-performance is leading to improved discipline in
strategic purchasing of health services, including adher-
ence to benefits packages.6 Regulatory constraints can
arise from the way relations between the different institu-
tions of a health system—such as hospitals, primary care
organizations, local governments, and insurers—are orga-
nized via legal arrangements and professional regula-
tions.7 This implies that the autonomy of the institutions
is usually limited by regulatory statutes that may preclude
adoption of certain innovations. For example, efforts to
move certain interventions out of a hospital setting may
be frustrated by the organizational boundaries and fund-
ing mechanisms in place.
Many health system constraints can be eased in the
medium to long term. However, in the short-term, deci-
sions usually have to be taken subject to prevailing con-
straints. Recommendations from CEA could allow for the
type of health system in place. System design constraints
can be addressed technically by more careful analysis of
supply side and demand side responses to the introduction
of an intervention and—where necessary—by extension
of the optimization model to include multiple resource
constraints.8,9 In addition to yielding evidence that is
more immediately relevant to priority setters than crude
CEA, such analysis offers a great deal of valuable addi-
tional information; for example, on the effect of short-run
constraints in reducing the potential longer-run achieve-
ments of the health system. It can therefore help point to
the most urgent priorities for health system redesign.
Costs of Implementing Change
In its purest form, the rational cost-effectiveness model
assumes that change is instantaneous. This often does not
reflect realities of implementation. Any significant change
to the health system is likely to require irreversible
investment; for example, in the form of capital (new clin-
ics), personnel (training or redeployment), information
resources (data capture), implementation (new guide-
lines), or administrative complexity. Such irreversible
investments are transition costs. They can often act as a
major decision-making barrier to implementation of pro-
grams with long-term benefits, and even if the priority-
setting process is functioning properly, it may take con-
siderable managerial effort to ensure that the technology
is implemented.10 Therefore, an important consideration
for any priority-setting endeavor is the transition costs of
implementing a new intervention.
A more gradual reform may reduce transition costs
substantially. It may not only be infeasible but also ineffi-
cient for a government to reappraise continually the entire
health system. Rather, a more realistic aspiration is that a
government should progressively remove cost-ineffective
programs and replace them with more cost-effective
actions. This suggests that an incremental threshold for-
mulation of CEA may be closer to political reality than a
comprehensive zero-based formulation. The zero-based
approach requires a ranking of the cost-effectiveness of
all potential interventions, with only the most cost-effec-
tive being selected for inclusion in the publicly funded
benefits package, as attempted in the famous Oregon
experiment.11 The zero-based approach is likely to be
especially important when fundamental reform of a sys-
tem is needed, such as the introduction of universal cov-
erage. As well as defining the package, CEA can be used
to inform health system reforms necessary to maximize
returns from expenditure.
The incremental model implies that governments may set
priorities for action on the basis of criteria that are not con-
sidered in conventional cost-effectiveness models. These
might include the following:
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 The magnitude of the program involved: greatest poten-
tial gains may be secured by first reconsidering pro-
grams consuming a large part of health care expenditure.
 The existence of large differences between competing
technologies such as in outcomes, externalities, or
equity considerations.
 Practical considerations: programs may have priority
according to how feasible it is to change delivery pat-
terns and how high the transition costs are.
There are a number of approaches that have been devel-
oped to deal with the constraints imposed by transition costs,
of which program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA)
is one of the most prominent. PBMA can be interpreted as an
attempt to systemize the incremental budgeting approach. A
practical focus on the evaluation of relatively modest and
manageable changes, as opposed to adherence to historical
patterns, is the key contribution made by the PBMA
approach.12 The PBMA approach can be interpreted as a
complement to CEA because cost-effectiveness often remains
an important criterion for prioritizing.13 The cost effective-
ness and strategic planning project of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO-CHOICE) has addressed the inclusion of
implementation costs by proposing to assess mutual exclusive
scenarios across a variety of disease areas, including noncom-
municable diseases, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in
various low- and middle-income settings.14
In summary, it is important that a recommended interven-
tion should be implemented as intended, and substantial tran-
sition costs can often be an important requirement to ensure
that is the case. Such costs should in principle be incorpo-
rated into the CEA and written off over the expected lifetime
of the program. Costs could be disaggregated as far as possi-
ble to highlight major cost components that may arise. How-
ever, in practice, short-term transition costs can act as an
important decision-making barrier to implementation of pro-
grams with long-term benefits. Certain aspects of system
design can mitigate the rigidities caused by transition costs;
for example, the use of separate public-sector budgets for
covering such costs or the use of donor funds. However, it
may also be necessary to adapt CEA methodology to accom-
modate transition costs, either by explicitly including such
costs in the optimization model or by embedding CEA in a
broader decision-making process.
System Interdependencies Between Interventions
Most interventions rely on the existence of certain
aspects of health system infrastructure without which
delivery would be infeasible. This infrastructure might
include physical capital, the workforce, various supply
chains, and information technology. With a few excep-
tions, such resources are shared with many other inter-
ventions, often yielding the manifest economies of scope
that can be observed in all health systems. From an
accounting perspective, the costs of providing these
resources should be shared across the interventions that
use them. Changes to the mix of services using the
infrastructure may alter the costs and effectiveness of all
interventions that rely on it.[e] And the absence of cer-
tain types of infrastructure may preclude—or at least
seriously increase the costs—of adopting a new technol-
ogy. Thus, decisions cannot be made only on compari-
sons of average costs of individual services but must
take into account bundles of the services being provided
and the implications of shifting resources and redefining
packages and the corresponding losses or gains due to
changes in scale and scope of the packages. For exam-
ple, a new intervention to be delivered by community-
based nurses may only be highly cost-effective if a net-
work of such nurses is already in place but not if major
investments into such a network are required. Further-
more, the adoption (or absence) of certain interventions
may have implications for other programs of care. The
most obvious example of this is the joint supply of a
bundle of early-child interventions.
System interdependencies illustrate the limitation of
examining interventions in isolation. Any significant
reform of the health system design may affect not only
the long-run average costs of the intervention under
immediate scrutiny but also those of many other interven-
tions. System reform may require the comparison of two
entirely different configurations of service delivery, with
profound implications for different patient groups and
system costs. It is possible that such zero-based reforms
can never be fully adopted as a basis for decision making
but can still be used to indicate where the scope for
improved performance lies and determine policy on more
incremental changes to the system. The presence of sys-
tem-wide effects, and the complexities they introduce,
may explain why the greatest impact of CEA has been in
the realm of pharmaceutical treatments. New drugs can
often be adopted without major changes to the configura-
tion and mix of human and physical resources. Proper
modeling of system interdependencies is feasible in
principle within a CEA framework15 but may be chal-
lenging in practice. The interactions between interven-
tions must be modeled explicitly, perhaps by modeling an
64 Health Systems & Reform, Vol. 2 (2016), No. 1
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
he
lse
a &
 W
es
tm
ins
ter
 N
HS
 T
ru
st 
De
pt 
of
 U
ro
log
y]
 at
 01
:48
 29
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
intervention under two mutually exclusive scenarios—
with and without its complement. At the very least, where
feasible, there may be an argument in CEA for presenting
a range of cost-effectiveness ratios for interventions
where costs (and benefits) are dependent on the prevailing
system configuration.
Uncertainty in Estimates of Costs and Benefits
Uncertainty is inherent to all priority setting. It can take
numerous forms, including uncertainty in model parameters
(costs and benefits of interventions, especially in the longer
term; see Meltzer16), uncertainty about the nature and perfor-
mance of competing interventions (either now or in the
future; see Fenwick et al.17), uncertainty about patient
behavioral responses (such as uptake and compliance), and
uncertainty about provider responses. The importance of
uncertainty has long been recognized in cost-effectiveness
analysis, and there has been lively academic debate about
how to incorporate uncertainty into analytic models.18,19 The
role of uncertainty in constraining decisions is that—other
things being equal—greater levels of uncertainty inhibit
decision makers from implementing change. This may be
due to natural risk aversion, especially when political or
managerial futures are at stake. However, uncertainty also
puts at risk any irreversible investment costs associated with
change.
Uncertainty can therefore act as a powerful barrier to any
change. In some circumstances the conservatism it causes
may be warranted, because a delayed decision may avoid
unnecessary investments and keep options open for the
future. However, a vague appeal to uncertainty may, on the
other hand, inhibit timely adoption of cost-effective pro-
grams. The key requirement then is to inform decision mak-
ers about the true level and nature of uncertainty, so that they
can make balanced judgements. Cost-effectiveness analysis
can act as a powerful device for assessing and communicat-
ing uncertainty. A range of analytic methods have been
developed to address and communicate parameter uncer-
tainty. These should be adopted wherever feasible. Account-
ing for parameter uncertainty by probabilistic sensitivity
analysis, and the presentation of its result via cost-effective-
ness acceptability curves, is well established and required for
submission of CEAs to the English National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence.20,21
However, there is also a broader issue of structural
uncertainty that reflects potential limitations in modeling,
such as the inclusion/exclusion of relevant comparators,
inclusion/exclusion of relevant events, the statistical
models to estimate specific parameters, and clinical
uncertainty or lack of clinical evidence.22 This structural
uncertainty is the main source of concern in priority set-
ting, because its magnitude is difficult to quantify, and
risk-averse decision makers will naturally be reluctant to
act when there are concerns about the relevance and qual-
ity of the analytic evidence base. Sensitivity analysis is of
course then an important instrument for assessing the
robustness of estimates to alternative model specifica-
tions. Novel approaches such as model averaging are
becoming more widely used to address problems related
to model uncertainty; that is, uncertainty related to the
choice of explanatory variables.23
The most obvious way to reduce any form of uncer-
tainty is to commission relevant research, seek out high-
quality data, undertake relevant meta-analyses, improve
the quality of modeling, and carry out value of informa-
tion analysis to identify priorities for generating new evi-
dence.24 This will allow uncertainty to be incorporated in
a systematic manner into the evidence base. Of course,
these endeavors are both costly and time-consuming and
will in themselves create new delays. Robustness analysis
can be used as a practical means of handling uncertainty
in decision making.25 It assesses the flexibility achieved
or denied by particular acts of commitments, provided
that they can or must be staged sequentially. In the same
vein, option pricing theory has been applied to economic
evaluation by Palmer and Smith26 as a means of assessing
the value of deferring decisions pending the arrival of
better information. Despite these methodological advan-
ces, uncertainty will always remain intrinsic to strategic
priority setting. The key requirement is to inform decision
makers about the true level and nature of uncertainty, so
that they can make balanced judgements. A failure to
convey uncertainty properly may give rise to “uncertainty
about the level of uncertainty” underlying a decision and
therefore inhibit warranted change. Therefore, for deci-
sion makers with little technical expertise, innovative
ways of communicating uncertainty may be needed.
Weak Governance
Whatever type of health system is under consideration, most
tools of health policy assume the existence and effectiveness
of certain instruments of good governance. In choosing to
include a treatment in the benefits package on the basis of
CEA, policy makers are presuming that it will be delivered
in line with the CEA modeling assumptions. The governance
requirements to underpin any priority setting task are likely
to include the following:
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 Clear mechanisms for promulgating guidelines and
financing the required activity, possibly extending to
contractual arrangements.
 Effective data collection mechanisms designed to audit
delivery of care and adherence to quality standards.
 Functioning accountability mechanisms that enable pro-
viders and other relevant parties to be held to account
for the performance they have secured.27
The level of detail at which priorities can be set may be
determined by the administrative capacity of the health sys-
tem. At one extreme, the benefits package might be explicitly
defined in terms of detailed interventions and eligibility crite-
ria. International bodies such as the World Health Organiza-
tion and the Global Fund could help in this task by providing
generic resources that may be suitable for assessing the cost-
effectiveness of specific interventions. At the other extreme,
priorities might be set in very broad terms, such as emphasiz-
ing a larger role for primary care relative to secondary and
tertiary care. Of course, the risk of adopting a broad defini-
tion of priorities is that the prioritized sector may provide
some services that are not cost-effective.
In many health systems, the limited capacity for audit and
performance reporting inhibits the ability to set and monitor
detailed priorities.28 The most poorly developed aspects of
governance are the mechanisms to hold to account providers
and other relevant agents for the levels of performance they
have achieved, via mechanisms that include consumer mar-
kets, administrative procurement arrangements, democratic
elections, or professional regulation. The prime purpose of
an accountability mechanism is to allow stakeholders to
check on adherence to standards and give them a means of
offering rewards or sanctions depending on results.
An absence of good governance in any of these three key
areas—priority setting, performance measurement, or account-
ability mechanisms—seriously undermines the capacity for
change and may render the adoption of certain services infea-
sible or ineffective. It is difficult to offer generic guidance on
how to confront or sidestep the constraints caused by weak
governance. CEA may consider these realities by constraining
the number of decisions that can be made in a given time
period. In all health systems, there is likely to be a trade-off
between the health gains secured by detailed priority setting
and the governance costs of specifying and monitoring adher-
ence to the package. Whatever approach is taken, it is impor-
tant to note that CEA can play an important accountability
role, by demonstrating the costs to the health system of contin-
ued shortcomings in governance capacity and indicating where
the priorities for improvement may lie.
Political Constraints
The process of priority setting takes place in a profoundly
political context, in which numerous influential political inter-
est groups seek to participate.29 Hauck and Smith30 presented
several models of political economy that describe how deci-
sion makers react to political realities and how priority-setting
decisions may be influenced by them. Such models try to
explain why the political decision-making process fails to gen-
erate apparently welfare-improving policy changes. Goddard
et al.31 argued that there may be substantial benefits to seeking
to understand the processes of priority setting using models
based on political concepts. We consider five classes of politi-
cal forces and the influence they exert on decision makers:
The median voter model, interest groups, bureaucratic deci-
sion making, decentralization, and equity.
The median voter model32 asserts that political decision
makers will seek to develop policies that attract the median
voter, in an effort to maximize political support. The implica-
tion of this insight for priority setting is that the size and con-
tents of a public benefits package may be skewed toward the
preferences of key voting groups. Gaining taxpayer support
for health policies has high importance for policy makers, in
particular in many low-income countries with high levels of
informal employment where tax contributions are concen-
trated among a relatively small, urban elite. Models of com-
peting interest groups are based on the assumption that
powerful interest groups may seek to skew decisions in their
own favor at the expense of less organized stakeholders.33
Within health care, small groups with a clearly defined com-
mon objective—for example, providers of health services,
the pharmaceutical industry, or patients with a specific dis-
ease—have low costs in organizing themselves, securing
cohesion, and effectively lobbying decision makers to their
advantage, compared to the broader population, whose inter-
ests may be more diffuse and who experience higher costs of
organizing.
The institutional theories of Tullock34 and Niskanen35
focus on the interests of bureaucrats in maximizing their influ-
ence and the effect of their behavior on the level and nature of
government output. The essence of this approach is the belief
that such bureaucrats receive power and remuneration in pro-
portion to the size of their enterprise, with the implication that
bloated and inefficient public services emerge if there is a lack
of effective control on the growth of government. Many health
care systems make extensive use of subsidiary levels of gov-
ernment, and such decentralization adds further complexities
that affect variations in spending and benefits packages,36
although the direction and magnitude of effects are likely to
depend on specific institutional arrangements for such policies.
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Decentralization may be associated with improved perfor-
mance resulting from increased horizontal competition
between different levels of governments, although empirical
evidence is mixed, and the outcomes are likely to depend
upon the institutional structure at each level. The promotion of
equity in health and health care can in some respects be
viewed as a political constraint. Equity concepts can readily
be incorporated into conventional CEA; for example, by plac-
ing greater weight on health gains for disadvantaged popula-
tion groups. However, the nature of equity criteria adopted in
health policy is likely to vary between health systems, so it
will be difficult to develop universal equity-weighted meas-
ures of cost-effectiveness.37
Public involvement in decision making has been advo-
cated as one approach to ameliorate potentially unwarranted
impacts of political constraints. However, a scoping review
found it difficult to assess the extent to which public
involvement is more or less vulnerable to capture by interest
groups because formal evaluations of public engagement
efforts are rare.38 Priority setting is ultimately a political
undertaking. To some extent, the health technology assess-
ment agencies now being put in place across the world are
an indication that politicians feel it is helpful and expedient
to devolve some aspects of that process to agencies with
politically legislated terms of reference. At its best, this
approach can lead to better informed rankings of interven-
tions, made on a consistent basis, aligned with social prefer-
ences. However, the technical recommendations of those
agencies must almost always be viewed from a broader per-
spective than that of narrowly defined CEA. In some cases
that broader scrutiny may be undertaken within the agency
(as in the National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence); in others it must be left to those who are ultimately
accountable for choosing priorities. In either case, a key
consideration will be the political context within which the
decision is being made.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has assumed that a decision maker accepts the
general principles underlying CEA. It then considered six
types of constraint under which such decision makers must
operate when considering the implementation of CEA rec-
ommendations. See Table 1 for an overview of constraints
and potential approaches to addressing them, either by
incorporating them into CEA or by introducing adjustments
to institutional arrangements. There are frequently links
between the classes of constraint, and none can be consid-
ered in isolation. For example, many of the constraints
caused by uncertainty arise because of the irreversible costs
of implementing a change. Health system design constraints
may arise in part because of weaknesses in governance.
The difficulty of assessing interdependencies within the
health system may reflect limited analytic and decision-
making capacity. This may change in future, as efforts are
made to increase analytical capacity and international col-
laborations among modelers.
Where feasible, the article has outlined possible ways of
addressing the strategic constraints under consideration. A
fundamental choice is often whether to accept and
Constraint Solution
Health system design
constraint
 Requires institutional adjustments, but can be incorporated into CEA analytically via:
 Analyse supply- and demand side responses
 Incorporate multiple resource constraints into the mathematical modelling
Implementation costs  Incorporate transition costs into the mathematical modelling
 Disaggregate costs to highlight major cost components
System interactions  Model interactions between interventions by incorporating economies of scope
 Model intervention under alternative scenarios (with and without complementary intervention)
 Present range of CE ratios dependant on prevailing system configuration
Uncertainty  Conduct probabilistic sensitivity analysis
 Present extent of uncertainty via cost-effectiveness acceptability curves
 Address structural uncertainty with sensitivity analyses
 Commission additional research
 Evaluate robustness of decisions under alternative future scenarios
Governance constraints  Requires institutional adjustments, and difficult to incorporate into CEA analytically, but possibly:
 Constrain the number of decisions that can be made in a given time period
Political constraints  Requires institutional adjustments, possibly:
 Devolve process of priority setting to agencies with politically determined terms of reference
 Public involvement in decision making
TABLE 1. Six Constraints and Proposed Solutions to Incorporate Them into Cost Effectiveness Analysis
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accommodate the constraint or to seek to relax the constraint
itself. It is important to recognize that some constraints may
be in place for good regulatory reasons (such as a concern
with equity) and that relaxation of other constraints may in
any case not be feasible in the short run. For some of the con-
straints, in particular the ones related to costs of change, we
make the implicit assumption that a new intervention is com-
pared against current standard of care. We acknowledge that
the discussion may need to be slightly more nuanced if two
or more new interventions are compared.
Many of the constraints described can in principle be
modeled by augmenting the simple CEA mathematical
programming model to include additional considerations.
For example, additional resource constraints, say, in the
form of workforce numbers, can be added; interdependen-
cies between interventions can be modeled by incorporat-
ing constraints that reflect economies of scope and
considering portfolios of interventions using integer pro-
gramming; nonlinearities—for example, in the form of
variable returns to scale— can be reflected in the model;
limited decision-making capacity can be modeled by con-
straining the number of decisions that can be made in a
given time period; the model can be formulated as an
incremental priority-setting model, which assesses poten-
tial change from the current situation; and uncertainty
can be incorporated by adding variability to parameters
and (for example) reformulating as a stochastic mathe-
matical program.
Though offering more realistic modeling of the deci-
sion setting, such innovations introduce serious draw-
backs. First, the analytic complexity and information
demands are increased considerably, and in many circum-
stances parameterization of the augmented model would
be infeasible. Second, the model would have to be tai-
lored to each individual setting, leading to a vast increase
in the need for analytic capacity. And third, the simple
transferability and clarity of the conventional CEA would
be lost. In short, further tailored refinements of the math-
ematical decision model will be helpful in individual set-
tings but is less likely to be appropriate when seeking to
offer generic advice to a wide range of countries. There
are some classes of constraint, related to governance and
politics, that cannot be managed analytically. Rather than
trying to model the constraints, the role of CEA under
such circumstances is to indicate the opportunity costs of
not being able to adopt certain optimal courses of action.
Thus, although it can be argued that the world is rarely
as simple as that represented in the theory of CEA,
undertaking such analysis can nevertheless still yield
powerful benefits by identifying the key bottlenecks to
reform and indicating the priority areas for action. It may
also help overseas aid organizations identify where their
funds are best directed.
To conclude, we can put forward a number of principles
for disseminating CEA that can be drawn out from the dis-
cussion of constraints. For example, cost could be explained
and disaggregated in more detail, so that decision makers can
see more clearly the assumptions underlying the analysis and
where the major sources of costs arise. In this way, they can
make adjustments if they feel that the original setting or costs
were inappropriate to their situation. The CEA could be
accompanied by a narrative that sets out the significant inter-
actions of the intervention under scrutiny with other interven-
tions in the health system and the circumstances in which
they may be important. The strength of CEA recommenda-
tions could be varied depending on the robustness of the
cost-effectiveness evidence. However, this must be accompa-
nied by clear guidance on what is considered robust evi-
dence. Uncertainty could be treated more systematically.
Though great strides have been made in modeling certain
types of uncertainty, further improvements could be made in
helping decision makers understand the implications for their
system. Subgroup analysis could be encouraged in order to
help decision makers understand the implications for equity
objectives and the implications of heterogeneity in costs and
benefits of an intervention across the population.
Progress has been made in some of these areas, and
the main thrust of future work should be to consolidate
and formalize existing methods. In other areas, there is a
need for preliminary ground-clearing work before signifi-
cant progress can be made. The complications introduced
by system constraints in no way undermine the central
role that can be played by CEA in the process of strategic
priority setting in health services. Rather, the existence of
such constraints underlines the importance of ensuring
that the modeling process underlying CEA—as far as fea-
sible—takes account of the constraints. Where it is not
feasible, results should be presented so that decision
makers can properly understand the simplifying assump-
tions that have been made. Failure to implement the rec-
ommendations of CEA should offer an important
indication of the opportunity costs (measured in terms of
lost health) arising from system constraints and other con-
siderations that may have affected the decision. Where
necessary, by quantifying the opportunity cost of failing
to implement, the CEA can then act as a powerful driver
for health system reform designed to address particularly
serious constraints to improvement. CEA methods can
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therefore help decision makers to tailor recommendations
to local circumstances, to understand the most important
constraints inhibiting adoption or abandonment of tech-
nologies, and to assess whether and how to address those
constraints.
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NOTES
[a] For the purpose of this article, we sidestep the issue of
what precisely should be considered value or welfare.
There is considerable discussion in the literature on this
issue. For example, the extensive literature on equity
weighting of health or recent research on happiness sug-
gests that measuring welfare in terms of health in CEA
is too narrow a focus.39
[b] Conversely CEA can be formulated as seeking to mini-
mize the costs needed to achieve a certain level of
health benefit. The two formulations are mathematically
equivalent.
[c] Additional constraints are for example the capacity of
countries to produce high-quality CEAs or governance
arrangements that may affect the relation between the
agency producing CEAs and decision makers. There are
further important demand-side responses to the intro-
duction of an intervention. Uptake and acceptance of an
intervention by individuals are important behavioral
responses that may greatly impact on the feasibility of
implementing interventions. They may explain why
strategic decision makers depart from national or inter-
national guidance.
[d] Economies of scope are a proportionate saving gained
by producing two or more distinct goods, when the cost
of doing so is less than that of producing each
separately.
[e] It is important to note that existing infrastructure may
sometimes reduce costs (at least in the short run) rela-
tive to those assumed in the CEA, thus potentially mak-
ing the service under scrutiny more cost-effective than
indicated by the CEA. Economies of scope are a propor-
tionate saving gained by producing two or more distinct
goods, when the cost of doing so is less than that of pro-
ducing each separately.
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